Fodors Functionalism Essays -- Body Mind Psychology Essays Searle

Fodors FunctionalismFodor begins his article on the mind-body problem with a review of the current theories of dualism and materialism. According to dualism, the mind and body are dickens separate entities with the body being physical and the mind being nonphysical. If this is the case, though, then there can be no interaction between the two. The mind could not influence anything physical without violating the laws of physics. The materialist possibleness, on the other hand, states that the mind is not distinct from the physical. In fact, supporters of the materialist theory believe that behavior does not have mental causes. When the materialist theory is split into logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, the foundation of functionalism begins to form. Logical behaviorism states that every mental feeling has the same meaning as an if-then statement. For example, instead of adage Dr. Lux is hungry, one would say If there was a quart of macadamia brittle nut in t he freezer, Dr. Lux would eat it. The central-state identity theory states that a certain mental state equals a certain neurophysiological state. The theory works in a way similar to Berkeleys representation of objects. twain mental states and objects are a certain collection of perceptions that together identify the particular state or object.Fodor develops the idea of functionalism by combining certain separate of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory. From logical behaviorism, Fodor incorporates the idea that mental processes can be represented by physical if-then statements. As such, behavior and mental creator are no longer distinct and unable to interact. Also, logical behaviorism provides a way for mental causes to interact with other mental causes. This, in turn, may result in a behavioral effect. The last point is also a characteristic of the central-state identity theory. One doctrine of the central-state identity theory is called figure physicalism . Token physicalism states that all mental states that currently exist are neurophysiological. Thus, token physicalism does not place physical restrictions on the type of warmness capable of having mental properties. When the points of logical behaviorism and the central-state identity theory, as described here, are combined, functionalism is the result. The theory of functionalism supposes that a m... ...whether the simulation of mental processes resulting from a computer architectural plan are real mental processes?At the end of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring privileged the brain. There is no external cause that determines what a mental process will be. Also, there is a distinction between the identification of symbols and the understanding of what the symbols mean. information processing system programs are defined by symbol identification rather tha n understanding. On the other hand, minds define mental processes by the understanding of what a symbol means. The last leading from this is that computer programs by themselves are not minds and do not have minds. In addition, a mind cannot be the result of running a computer program. Therefore, minds and computer programs are not entities with the same mental state. They are quite different and although they both are capable of input and output interactions, whole the mind is capable of truly thinking and understanding. This quality is what distinguishes the mental state of a mind from the systemic state of a digital computer.